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Abstract—We consider the economics of the interaction be-
tween Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) and Mobile
Network Operators (MNOs). We investigate the incentives of an
MNO for offering some of her resources to an MVNO instead of
using the resources for her own End-Users (EUs). We consider
a market with one MNO and one MVNO, and a continuum
of undecided EUs. Two cases for EUs are considered: (i) when
EUs need to choose either the MNO or the MVNO, and (ii) when
EUs have an outside option. In each of these cases, we consider a
non-cooperative framework of sequential game and a cooperative
framework of bargaining game. We characterize the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) and Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) of the sequential and bargaining games, respectively. We
show that in the non-cooperative framework, SPNE assumes two
forms: (i) the MNO invests minimally on her infrastructure and
the MVNO leases all the newly invested resources and (ii) the
MNO invests more on her infrastructure, the MVNO leases only
part of these resources to the MVNO, and the MNO uses the
rest herself to attract EUs. Thus, in both, the MNO generates
revenue indirectly through the MVNO. In addition to that, in (ii),
the MNO generates revenue directly from the EUs. We also prove
that in the bargaining framework, the MVNO either reserves all
the resources or no resources from the MNO, and the MNO’s
investments are guided by whether EUs have an outside option.
If they don’t, then the MNO invests as little as possible on her
infrastructure. If they do, then the MNO invests more.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, wireless services have been offered by Service
Providers (SPs) that own the infrastructure they are operating
on. Nowadays SPs are divided into (i) Mobile Network Op-
erators (MNOs) that own the infrastructure, and (ii) Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) that do not own the
infrastructure they are operating on, and use the resources of
one or more MNOs based on a business contract. MVNOs can
distinguish their plans from MNOs by bundling their service
with other products, offering different pricing plans for End-
Users (EUs), or building a good reputation through a better
customer service. In recent years, the number of MVNOs
has been rapidly growing. According to [2], between June
2010 and June 2015, the number of MVNOs increased by 70
percent worldwide, reaching 1,017 as of June 2015. Even some
MNOs developed their own MVNOs. An example of which is
Cricket wireless which is owned by At&t and offers a prepaid
Parts of this work was presented in CISS’17 [1].
wireless service to EUs. Another example of MVNOs is the
Google’s Project Fi in which the customer’s service is handled
using Wifi hotspots wherever/whenever they exist. If no Wifi
is available, then the service is handled using the resources of
Sprint, T-Mobile or U.S. Cellular networks, whichever has the
better service at that particular location/time.
In this work, we consider the economics of the interaction
between MVNOs and MNOs. We investigate the incentives
of an MNO for offering some of her resources to an MVNO
instead of using the resources for her own. Thus, we consider
the interplay of competition and cooperation between an
MNO and an MVNO. The goal is to investigate that under
what parameters the competition between SPs overshadow
their cooperation and vice versa. We investigate this interplay
between competition and cooperation through cooperative
and non-cooperative game frameworks. Note that it is not
apriori known how much an MNO is willing to invest on
the infrastructure and how much an MVNO is willing to
lease. More importantly, it is not apriori clear that under what
conditions the MNO prefers to generate her revenue through
the MVNO by leasing the resources to her, and therefore
letting the MVNO to attract EUs.
Many works have considered the economics of re-
source/spectrum sharing and the subsequent profit sharing
between SPs. Examples are [3]–[13]. In these works, authors
model the environment using game theory and seek to provide
intuitions for the pricing schemes, the split of EUs/benefits
between SPs, and the investment level of different SPs. In
this work, however, as mentioned before, we focus on the
competition between the MNOs and MVNOs and its interplay
with cooperation among them.
We consider a market with one MNO (e.g. AT&T) and
one MVNO (e.g. Google’s Project Fi). The MNO decides on
investing new resources, and the MVNO leases some of these
newly invested resources in exchange of a fee. Both MNO
and MNVO simultaneously decide on their pricing strategies
for EUs, and EUs choose one of the MNO or MVNO to
buy the wireless plan from. First, we assume the per resource
fee that the MVNO pays to the MNO to be fixed. Then, we
discuss about the implications of this fee and frameworks for
characterizing it.
To model EUs, we consider the hotelling model, in which
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we consider a continuum of undecided EUs that decide which
of the SPs they want to buy their wireless plan from. We
assume that EUs have different preferences for each SP. These
preferences can be because of different services that SPs offer.
For example, the MVNO can bundle the wireless service
with a free or cheap international call plan (through VoIP)
to make her service more favorable for some EUs. Moreover,
the preferences can be because of the reluctance of an EU to
buy her wireless plan from a particular SP (e.g. an SP with an
infamous customer service). We assume that the preferences
also depend on the investment level of the SPs. In other words,
the higher the investment level of an SP, the lower would be
the reluctance of an EU for that SP.
We consider two cases. In the first case, SPs compete to
attract EUs modeled using the hotelling model, and the EUs
have to choose one the SPs (i.e., there does not exist an
outside option). In the second case, we consider the demand
of SPs to be generated both through the hotelling model and
also a demand function. The effects of the demand function
are two-fold. First, the demand function models the attrition
in the number of EUs of SPs if the investment or price of
both SPs are not desirable for EUs. Thus, in effect, an EU
may opt for neither SP if neither offers a price-quality combo
that is to his satisfaction, which is equivalent to the existence
of an outside option for them. Second, the demand function
models an exclusive additional customer base for each of the
SPs to draw from depending on her investment and the price
she offers. In each of the two cases, concerning an outside
option, we consider both non-cooperative and cooperative
frameworks of interaction. In the non-cooperative scenario, we
consider a sequential game in which the SPs compete over the
EUs and decide on the level of cooperation individually and
sequentially. In the cooperative scenario, the SPs still compete
over the EUs, but they jointly decide their investments and how
to share the total proceeds through a bargaining game which
determines the shares in accordance with the investment levels
and the EU subscription for each.
In this setting, different outcomes may occurs. For example,
if EUs in the hotelling model have high preferences for the
MVNO, e.g. because of a good customer service, then the
MNO may prefer to lease some of her resources to the MVNO
and receives her share of profit through the MVNO, instead of
competing for EUs by lowering her price. On the other hand,
if EUs have high preferences for the MNO or she can attract
more exclusive EUs by using the resources herself, then no
cooperation between the MNO and the MVNO occurs.
We start with the first case in which EUs are modeled using
the hotelling model. We formulate the game as a sequential
game (Section II), and seek the Sub-game Perfect Nash
Eequilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential game using backward
induction (Section III). We prove that the SPNE outcome of
the game exists, is unique, and is of the form of two possible
outcomes which we characterize. In one of the outcomes, the
MNO invests minimally on her infrastructure and the MVNO
leases all the newly invested resources from the MNO. Thus,
in this case, the MNO prefers to generate revenue through the
MVNO instead of directly generating revenue from EUs. On
the other hand, in the second outcome, MNO invests more on
her infrastructure, leases parts of these resources to the MVNO
and uses the rest to attract EUs herself. Therefore, in this
case, MNO generates parts of her revenue through the MVNO
and the rest directly through the EUs. Numerical results in
Section III-C reveal that the former outcome occurs when the
per resource fee that the MVNO pays to the MNO is smaller
than a threshold, and the latter outcome occurs when the per
resource fee is higher than the threshold. Thus, the per resource
fee is one of the most important parameters that influences the
interplay of competition and cooperation between MNOs and
MVNOs.
In addition to the aforementioned non-cooperative frame-
work, we consider a bargaining framework to determine the
amount of cooperation between SPs and the split of profit
between them (Section III-D). We characterize the Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS) of the game, and prove that when
EUs do not have an outside option, the bargaining framework
yields a collusive outcome in which the MNO invests as little
as possible (zero, without external or regulatory forces). In
addition, the MVNO either reserves all the resources or no
resources from the MNO.
In Section IV, we focus on the second case in which
the demand of SPs are generated both through the hotelling
model and also a demand function. In the non-cooperative
framework, we characterize the SPNE outcome of the game.
Results reveal that the general behavior of the SPNE outcome
would be similar to that of the previous model, i.e. EUs with
no outside option. We also analyze the bargaining framework
associated with this case. Results of the bargaining framework
in this case are slightly different from the previous case. In
this case, the results of the NBS yields a milder version of
the aforementioned collusive outcome in which the MNO
no longer opt for the lowest investment level. However, the
MVNO still either reserves all the resources or no resources
from the MNO. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. MODEL
We now present a system model that we use in Section III.
This model is also updated and used in Section IV. First, we
model the payoffs and strategies of SPs, then we model the
EUs and their decision making process. Finally, at the end
of the section, we formulate the interaction between different
entities of the game using a non-cooperative sequential game
framework.
SPs:
We consider one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and one
Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) that compete in
attracting a pool of undecided EUs. We denote the MNO by
SPL (L represents Leader, since this SP is the leader of the
game), and denote the MVNO by SPF (F represents Follower,
since this SP is the follower of this leader/follower game).
SPL owns the infrastructure, invests in her infrastructure to
attract EUs, and can lease parts of the new resources to SPF
in exchange of money.
We denote the fee per resources that SPF pays to SPL by s,
the fraction of EUs that SPF and SPL attract by nF and nL,
respectively, and the access fees that SPF and SPL charge the
EUs by pF and pL, respectively. The utility of SPs is increas-
ing with the revenue from EUs, which depends on the number
of EUs and the access fee. The utility of SPF (respectively,
SPL) is decreasing (respectively, increasing) with respect to
the fee that SPF pays to SPL to reserve resources. In addition,
the utility of SPL is decreasing with the cost of investing on
the infrastructure. Naturally, we expect the cost of reserving
resources and investing in the infrastructure to be strictly
convex, i.e. the cost of investment per resources increases
with the amount of resources. For simplicity in analysis, we
consider these costs to be quadratic1. More specifically, we
consider the fee that SPF pays to SPL for resources to be sI2F ,
where IF is the number of resources that SPF reserves from
SPL. We also consider the investment cost that SPL incurs to
be γI2L, where IL is the number of resources that SPL adds
to her infrastructure, and γ is the marginal cost of investment.
Thus, the payoffs of SPs are:
piF = nF (pF − c)− sI2F (1)
piL = nL(pL − c) + sI2F − γI2L (2)
Naturally, we assume that the fee per resources (s) that SPF
pays to SPL is at least equal to the marginal cost of investment
on the infrastructure (γ), i.e. s ≥ γ. Also, note that IF ≤ IL.
To have a non-trivial problem, we also assume IL > 0 and
IF ≥ 0.
The strategies of SPL and SPF is to choose the access
fee for EUs (pL and PF , respectively) and the level of
investment (IL and IF , respectively). First, we assume that
the per resource fee s is pre-determined. In effect, we relax
this assumption later when we discuss about the bargaining
framework between SPL and SPF .
EUs:
The strategy of an EU is to choose one of the SPs to buy
wireless plan from. Towards that end, we consider that SPs
decide based on their utility which depends on the resources
the SPs invest (which is an indicator of the quality they
provide), the inherent preferences for SPs2, and the also
the price they pay. In particular, the utility of an EU with
preference xj for SPj , j ∈ {L,F} is:
uxj = v
∗ − tjxj − pj (3)
1The overall intuitions of the model are expected to be the same in the case
of considering any convex function of IF .
2These preferences do not depend on other parameters of the model and
strategies. This is why we denote them as inherent preferences. As discussed
in the introduction, these preferences can be because of different services that
SPs offer, e.g. bundling wireless service with a free or cheap international call
plan. Moreover, the preferences can be because of the reluctance of an EU
to buy her wireless plan from a particular SP, e.g. an SP with an infamous
customer service.
where tj is depends on the relative investment level of the SPs
(explained later), and v∗ is a common valuation that captures
the value of buying a wireless plan for EUs regardless of the
SP chosen, the investment level, or the price.
To model the inherent preferences of EUs, we use a
hotelling model. We assume that SPL is located at 0, SPF
is located at 1, and EUs are distributed uniformly along the
unit interval [0, 1]. The closer an EU to an SP, the more this
EU prefers this SP to the other. Specifically, the EU located
at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a cost of tLx (respectively, tF (1 − x))
when joining SPL (respectively, SPF ). Note that the notion
of closeness and distance is used to model the preference of
EUs, and may not be the same as physical distance.
We now describe how tj’s depend on the relative investment
level of SPs. We consider that the higher the investment level
of SPL (respectively, SPF ) in comparison to the other SP, the
lower would be tL (respectively tF ). Thus:
tL =
IF
IL
(4)
tF = 1− tL = IL − IF
IL
(5)
Thus, tL and tF capture the impact of quality of service in
the decision of EUs.
Note that from (3), even when IF = 0 (i.e. SPF makes
zero investment) and IF = IL (i.e. EUs of SPL do not get
any benefit from the investment of SPL), EUs may still join
SPF and SPL, respectively. This happens since both SPF and
SPL usually have access to separate resources that they can
use to serve the EUs who join them, above and beyond the
strategic investments IF , IL they make and acquire for their
mutual transactions. For example, SPL will have additional
spectrum and infrastructure beyond what it offers to SPF (i.e,
IL), and SPF would also have spectrum and infrastructure
it acquires from other MNOs (many MVNOs simultaneously
transact with multiple MVNOs). The quality of service that
can be obtained from these additional resources is captured in
v∗.
We also assume the full market coverage of EUs by SPs.
This means that each EU chooses exactly one SP to subscribe
to. This assumption is common in hotelling models and is
necessary to ensure competition between SPs. An equivalent
assumption is to consider the common valuation v∗ to be
sufficiently large so that the utility of EUs for buying a
wireless plan is positive regardless of the choice of SP. Later,
in Section IV, we consider the demand of SPs to be generated
both through the hotelling model and also a demand function.
This, in effect, models an outside option for EUs and relaxes
the assumption of full market coverage of EUs by SPs.
Non-Cooperative Sequential Game Formulation:
We model the interaction between SPs and EUs using a four-
stage sequential game. Naturally, we assume that SPL makes
the first move and is the leader of the game. The timing and
the stages of the game are as follows:
1) SPL decides on the investment on the infrastructure (IL).
2) SPF decides on the investment, i.e. number of resources
to lease from SPL (IF such that IF ≤ IL).
3) SPL and SPF determine the access fees for EUs (re-
spectively, pL and pF ).
4) EUs decide to subscribe to one of the SPs.
We assumed the selection of investments by SPs (IL and
IF ) happens before the selection of prices for EUs (pL and
pF ) since investment decisions are long-term decision. These
decisions are expected to be kept constant over longer time
horizons in comparison to pricing decisions.
In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction:
Definition 1. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE):
A strategy is an SPNE if and only if it constitutes a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
III. EUS WITH NO OUTSIDE OPTION
In this section, we consider that EUs are modeled using the
hotelling model. First, we characterize the SPNE strategies of
the game in Section III-A. Then, we summarize and discuss
about the outcome of the game in Section III-B. We provide
numerical results in Section III-C. The bargaining framework
for this case is presented in Section III-D.
A. SPNE Analysis
We use the backward induction to characterize SPNE strate-
gies. This means that we characterize the equilibrium strategies
starting from the last stage of the game and proceeding
backward. Thus, we start with Stage 4:
Stage 4: In this subsection, we characterize the division of
EUs between SPs in the equilibrium, i.e. nL and nF , using
the knowledge of the strategies chosen by the SPs in Stages
1, 2, and 3. To do so, we characterize the location of the EU
that is indifferent between joining either of the SPs, xn. Thus,
EUs located at [0, xn) join SPL, and those located at (xn, 1]
joins the non-neutral SPF (using the full market coverage
assumption).
The EU located at xn ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between
connecting to SPL ans SPF if:
v∗ − tF (1− xn)− pF = v∗ − tLxn − pL
⇒ xn = tF + pF − pL
tL + tF
(6)
Note that tF + tL = 1. Substituting the value of tF (5)
yields:
xn =
IL − IF
IL
+ pF − pL (7)
Note that EUs in the interval [0, xn) joins SPL and those in
the interval (xn, 1] joins SPF . Thus, the fraction of EUs with
each SP (nL and nF ) is:
nL =

0 if xn < 0
IL−IF
IL
+ pF − pL if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1
1 if xn > 1
nF = 1− nL
(8)
Stage 3: In this stage, SPL and SPF determine their prices
for EUs, pL and pF , respectively, to maximize their payoff.
We seek Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. Note that in general
there might exist several NE strategies: some of them corner
equilibria (an extreme case in which one of the SPs receives
zero EUs) and some interior equilibria (in which both SPs
receive a positive mass of EUs). We first argue, that there is
no corner equilibria. Then, we characterize the unique interior
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. There is no corner equilibrium, i.e. there is no
equilibrium by which nL = 0 or nF = 0.
Proof is presented in Appendix A.
Now, we look for all NE by which 0 < xn < 1 (xn
characterized in the previous stage of the game). In this case,
using (1), (2), and (8), the payoffs of SPs would be:
piF = (
IF
IL
+ pL − pF )(pF − c)− sIkF (9)
piL = (
IL − IF
IL
+ pF − pL)(pL − c) + sIkF − γIkL (10)
In the following theorem, we prove that the NE uniquely exists
and characterize it:
Theorem 2. The NE strategies of Stage 3 by which 0 < nL <
1 and 0 < nF < 1 are unique, and are pF = c+ IL+IF3IL and
pL = c+
2IL−IF
3IL
.
Remark 1. Note that pL (respectively, pF ) is increasing with
respect to IL (respectively, IF ). Also, pL (respectively, pF )
is decreasing with respect to IF (respectively, IL). Also note
that prices depend only on the cost and the relative investment
level of the SPs, i.e. IFIL .
Proof. In this case, for an interior NE, p∗F and p
∗
L should be
determined to satisfy the first order condition, i.e. dpiFdpF = 0
and dpiLdpL = 0. The first order conditions yield:
2p∗F − p∗L = IF
IL
+ c & 2p∗L − p∗F = IL − IF
IL
+ c
Thus,
p∗F = c+
IL + IF
3IL
& p∗L = c+
2IL − IF
3IL
(11)
Therefore, p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE strategies if they
yield 0 < xn < 1 and no unilateral deviation is profitable for
SPs. In Part A, we check the former, and in Part B, we check
the latter.
Part A: We first check the condition that with p∗L and p∗F ,
0 < xn < 1. Using (7) and (11):
xn =
IL − IF
IL
+ p∗F − p∗L =
2IL − IF
3IL
which is greater than zero since IL ≥ IF and IL > 0. xn
is also clearly less than one (note that IF ≥ 0). Thus, the
condition 0 < xn < 1 holds.
Part B: Note that d
2piF
dp2F
< 0 and d
2piL
dp2L
< 0, at all values of
pF and pL. Thus, a local maxima would be a global maximum,
and any solutions to the first order conditions would maximize
the payoff of the SPs when 0 < xn < 1, and no unilateral
deviation by which 0 < xn < 1 would be profitable for SPs.
Now, we discuss that any deviation by SPs such that nL = 0
and nL = 1 (which subsequently yields nF = 1 and nF = 0,
respectively) is not profitable. Note that the payoff of SPs,
(1) and (2), are continuous as nL ↓ 0, and nL ↑ 1 (which
subsequently yields nF ↑ 1 and nF ↓ 0, respectively). Thus,
the payoffs of both SPs when selecting p∗L and p
∗
F (solutions of
first order conditions) are greater than or equal to the payoffs
when nL = 0 and nL = 1. Thus, any deviation by SPs such
that nL = 0 or nL = 1 is not profitable for SPs.
This complete the proof that p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE
strategies by which both SPs are active, i.e. 0 < xn < 1.
Stage 2: In this stage of the game, SPF decides on the
investment level, i.e. the number of resources to be leased
from SPL (IF ), with the condition that IF ≤ IL to maximize
piF . The optimization that would be solved by SPF is:
max
IF≤IL
piF = max
IF≤IL
(IL + IF
3IL
)2 − sI2F (12)
Note that for the last equality, we used (9) and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. The optimum investment level of SPF is:
I∗F =

IL
9sI2L−1
if IL >
√
2
9s
IL if IL ≤
√
2
9s
(13)
Remark 2. Note that in (13), I∗F is continuous at IL =
√
2
9s .
Remark 3. If the fee per resources (s) or the investment by
SPL (IL) is low, then SPF reserves all the available resources.
If not, then SPF reserves a fraction of available resources
(I∗F < IL). Note that in this case,
dI∗F
dIL
< 0. Thus, the higher
the number of available resources, the lower would be the
number of resources reserved by SPF . In addition, I∗F is
decreasing with s.
Proof. Note that in (12), piF is concave over IF if s > 19I2L
,
piF is convex if s < 19I2L
, and is linear if s = 1
9I2L
. We
characterize the optimum investment level, i.e. I∗F under each
of these conditions:
s > 1
9I2L
:
In this case, the payoff of SPF is concave. Thus, the first
order condition yields the possible optimum investment level,
IˆF :
dpiF
dIF
|IˆF = 0⇒
2(IˆF + IL)
9I2L
− 2sIˆF = 0
⇒ IˆF = IL
9sI2L − 1
(14)
Thus, the optimum investment level, I∗F is:
I∗F = min{IˆF , IL} (15)
Note that from the assumption of this case 9sI2L > 1. Thus,
IˆF > 0 (using (14)). In addition, from the expression of IˆF
(14):
IˆF < IL ⇐⇒ 9sI2L > 2
Thus, the optimum investment level for SPF would be:
I∗F =

IL
9sI2
L
−1 if IL >
√
2
9s
IL if IL ≤
√
2
9s
(16)
s < 1
9I2L
:
In this case, piF would be convex. Thus, the optimum level
of investment would be on the boundaries of the feasible set.
Thus, I∗F would be either 0 or IL, whichever yields a higher
payoff. Note that:
piF |IF=0 =
1
9
& piF |IF=IL =
4
9
− sI2L
Thus, I∗F = IL if and only if
4
9 − sI2L ≥ 19 (Note that we
assumed that if IF = 0 and IF = IL yield the same payoff,
then SPF chooses IF = IL). Thus, s ≤ 13I2L yields I
∗
F = IL.
Note that from the assumption of the case, s < 1
9I2L
< 1
3I2L
.
Thus, I∗F = IL.
s = 1
9I2L
:
In this case, piF would be an increasing linear function of
IF . Thus, I∗F = IL.
Putting all the cases together, the result of the theorem
follows.
Stage 1: In this stage, SPL decides on the level of in-
vestment IL to maximize her payoff, piL, where piL can be
characterized using (10) and Theorem 2:
max
IL
piL = max
IL
(
2IL − I∗F
3IL
)2 + sI∗2F − γI2L (17)
Note that I∗F is characterized in (13).
Now, we present a tie-breaking assumption by which SPL
decides on the level of investment chosen when there exists
multiple optimum solutions to (17). This assumption is moti-
vated by the fact that SPs prefer to offer a better quality of
service provided that their payoffs do not suffer by doing so:
Assumption 1. If there exists multiple investment levels, i.e.
IL, by which (17) is maximized, then in the equilibrium, SPL
chooses the largest investment level.
In the next theorem, we characterize the candidate optimum
answers:
Theorem 4. The optimum solution to (17) chosen by SPL is
I∗L = max(ˆIL), where IˆL is the set of all solutions to the
following optimization problem:
max
IL≥
√
2
9s
piL,I∗
F
=
1
9
(2− 1
9sI2L − 1
)2 + s(
IL
9sI2L − 1
)2 − γI2L
(18)
Remark 4. Theorem yields that the minimum optimum level
of investment by SPL is
√
2
9s .
Proof. To find the optimum level of investment, I∗L, consider
two scenarios:
IL ≤
√
2
9s :
In this case, I∗F = IL by (13). Thus, the maximization (17)
would become:
max
IL≤
√
2
9s
(s− γ)I2L
Thus:
I∗L =
{ √
2
9s if s ≥ γ
0 if s < γ
(19)
Note that Assumption 1 is the reason that for s = γ, IL =√
2
9s is chosen. Also, recall that to have a non-trivial problem,
we assumed s ≥ γ. Thus, if IL ≤
√
2
9s , then I
∗
L =
√
2
9s . Thus,
this case can be considered as part of the next part.
IL ≥
√
2
9s :
In this case, I∗F =
IL
9sI2L−1
. Note that I∗F (13) is con-
tinuous at IL =
√
2
9s (Remark 2). Thus, as IL →
√
2
9s ,
piL,I∗F → piL|IL=√ 29s . Therefore, this case also includes the
optimum answer of the previous case. Thus, the maximization
(17) would become:
max
IL≥
√
2
9s
piL,I∗
F
=
1
9
(2− 1
9sI2L − 1
)2 + s(
IL
9sI2L − 1
)2 − γI2L
(20)
Note that using Assumption 1, if there exists multiple solutions
to the maximization, the highest one would be chosen by SPL.
Results of the theorem follows.
B. The Outcome of the Game
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium outcome
of the game using the results of the previous section and
discuss about them. From Theorem 4, I∗L can be either
√
2
9s
or greater than that. In Corollaries 1 and 2, we characterize
the equilibrium outcome when I∗L >
√
2
9s and I
∗
L ≤
√
2
9s ,
respectively. Note that in each case, there exists a unique
outcome and the two cases are mutually exclusive. Thus, the
outcome of the game exists and is unique.
1) If I∗L >
√
2
9s :
Corollary 1 (Outcome A). If I∗L >
√
2
9s , then:
• Stage 1: The optimum level of investment by SPL is
characterized in Theorem 4.
• Stage 2: The optimum level of investment by SPF is:
I∗F =
I∗L
9sI∗2L −1
.
• Stage 3: Prices for EUs are: p∗F = c +
1+ 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 and
p∗L = c+
2− 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 .
• Stage 4: The fraction of EUs with each SP are: n∗F =
1+ 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 and n
∗
L =
2− 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 .
Proof. The outcome of Stage 1 directly follows from the
results of Stage 1 (Theorem 4). The outcome of Stage 2
directly follows from the results of Stage 2 (Theorem 3) and
the assumption of corollary that I∗L >
√
2
9s . The outcome of
Stage 3 follows from (11) and the outcome of Stage 2. The
outcome of Stage 4 follows from (8) and the outcomes of
Stage 2 and 3.
Note that in this case, as discussed, I∗F is decreasing with
respect to I∗L and s (Remark 3). In addition, when s is fixed,
p∗F and p
∗
L are decreasing and increasing with I
∗
L, respectively.
Also, when IL is fixed, p∗F and p
∗
L are decreasing and
increasing with respect to the per resource fee, s, respectively.
Note that s also affects the selection of IL. Thus, the general
relation between prices and s (when IL is not fixed) is more
complicated , and is investigated through numerical analysis
in Section III-C. The trends in n∗F and n
∗
L are similar to those
of p∗F and p
∗
L, respectively.
In Section III-C, we observe that I∗L is dependent on s.
Thus, the relationship between s and the outcome is more
complicated.
2) If I∗L ≤
√
2
9s :
Corollary 2 (Outcome B). If I∗L ≤
√
2
9s , then:
• Stage 1: I∗L =
√
2
9s .
• Stage 2: I∗F = I∗L.
• Stage 3: p∗F = c+
2
3 and p
∗
L = c+
1
3 .
• Stage 4: n∗F =
2
3 and n
∗
L =
1
3 .
Proof is similar to the proof of the previous corollary.
In this case, SPF reserves all available resources, and the
investment level of SPL (which is equal to the number of
resources reserved by SPF ) is a decreasing function of the fee
per resources, i.e. s. SPF quotes a higher price for EUs in
comparison to SPL. In spite of the higher price, SPF would
be able to attract more EUs given the better investment level
in comparison to SPL which translates into a better preference
for EUs.
Note that as mentioned in Remark 1, the prices of (and
subsequently the fraction of EUs with) SPs depend on the
relative investment level of SPs. Thus, since in outcome A,
the relative investment is fixed, i.e. IFIL = 1, the prices (and
subsequently the fraction of EUs) are constant with respect
to the investment values and subsequently s. Moreover, note
that although SPF leases all the new resources of SPL, SPL
is still able to attract 13 of EUs. This is because EUs obtain
benefits associated with SPs regardless of their strategies, as
mentioned in Model (Section II) in discusson after (5) and (4).
We calculate piL and piF using Corollary 2 and (2):
pi∗L =
1
3
− 2γ
9s
& pi∗F =
2
9
(21)
Thus, the payoff of SPL would be higher than the payoff of
SPF , i.e. pi∗L > pi
∗
F , if and only if s > 2γ. In this case, although
in comparison to SPF , SPL offers her service to EUs with
lower price and attracts a lower number of EUs, she can still
Fig. 1: Investment decisions of SPs vs. per resource fee, s.
Note that in Region B, I∗F = I
∗
L =
√
2
9s .
obtain a higher payoff through the per resource fee that she
collects from SPF . Thus, SPL leases the resources to SPF and
instead generates revenue through the fee she charges to SPF .
C. Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we use numerical simulations (i) to de-
termine whether and under what conditions the outcomes
in Corollaries 1 (Outcome A) and 2 (Outcome B) would
emerge, and (ii) to provide insights for results under different
parameters of the model. For all results, we consider c = 1.3
In Figure 1, we plot the optimum level of investment of SPL
(I∗L), the number of resources that SPF reserves (I
∗
F ), and the
minimum optimum level of investment by SPL (
√
2
9s ), when
γ = 0.1 (left) and γ = 0.01 (right) (recall that, in (2), γ is the
marginal cost of investment.). The discontinuities are because
of the transition of the outcome of the game from the Outcome
B to Outcome A. Thus, when s is smaller than a threshold,
SPL invests minimally (I∗L =
√
2
9s ), and SPF leases all the
new resources of SPL. On the other hand, after that threshold,
SPL invests more than the minimum, and SPF leases only a
portion of the new resources invested by SPL. The amount
that SPF leases in this region is smaller than the amount she
leases in the region of Outcome B. Results also reveal that I∗L
is strictly decreasing in each outcome with s. Thus, the higher
the fee per resources that SPF pays to SPL, the lower would
be the number of resources that SPF reserves (as revealed
by results in Theorem 3), and the lower would be (in each
region) the investment of SPL. Also, when the marginal cost
of investment is small (γ = 0.01), SPL investment is more
than the case that γ = 0.1. Thus, as expected, the higher the
investment cost, the lower would be the investment.
In Figure 2, we plot the pricing decisions of SPs for EUs,
i.e. p∗L and p
∗
F , for γ = 0.1 (left) and γ = 0.01 (right). Similar
to Figure 1, the discontinuities in the figures are because of
the transition of the outcome of the game from Outcome B to
3Note that the choice of c barely affects the results. It may only shift some
of the results (e.g. the price charged to EUs) by only a constant.
Fig. 2: Pricing decisions of SPs for EUs versus s
A. Note that results in Corollary 2 revealed that in Outcome B
(when s is sufficiently small), p∗F and p
∗
L are constant (given
that c is a constant) independent of γ and s and p∗F > p
∗
L.
On the other hand, in Region A, SPL would be able to charge
a higher price than SPF (Figure 2-right). This is due to the
fact that in Region A, SPL leases only a portion of the new
resources to SPF (Figure 1) and uses the rest for her own
EUs. Furthermore, in this region, p∗F is decreasing and p
∗
L is
increasing with respect to s. Note that the number of resources
for both SPL and SPF is decreasing with s. However, this
decreasing behavior affect the price that SPs charge to EUs
differently: makes SPF to decrease her price and enables SPL
to increase her price.
Note that by Corollaries 1 and 2, the dependency of n∗L and
n∗F to parameters of the model is similar to the dependency
of p∗L and p
∗
F . The only difference is the exclusion of c from
the expressions.
D. The Bargaining Framework
In this section, we complement the previous non-cooperative
framework by considering a hybrid of cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. In this case, the MVNO and the MNO
jointly decide on the investments (IL, IF ), but individually
decide on the prices for EUs. They split the profit (by selecting
the per resource fee s) based on the number of EUs and profit
each acquire.
In particular, for the cooperative part, we formulate a
bargaining framework, and use the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) to characterize IF , IL, and s:
Definition 2. Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): is the unique
solution (in our case the tuple of the payoffs of SPL and SPF )
that satisfies the four “reasonable” axioms (Invariant to affine
transformations, Pareto optimality, Independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and Symmetry) characterized in [14].
Note that after characterizing the NBS, the access fee for
EUs (pL and pF ) and the split of EUs between SPs can be
determined from Theorem 2 and equation (8).
In this cooperative framework, a collusive outcome may
occur in which both SPs jointly decrease the amount of
investment while maintaining a specific relative difference, i.e.
maintaining the differentiation between them that yields the
best outcome while minimizing the investment. The reason is
that EUs decide based on the ratio of the investment by SPs
and not the absolute values, i.e. EUs decide relatively. Thus,
a regulatory intervention may be desirable. Therefore, for the
rest of this section, we consider a regulator that enforces a
minimum investment level of IL,min on SPL, i.e. IL ≥ Imin,L.
Let 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 be the relative bargaining power of the SPF
over SPL: the higher w, more powerful is the bargaining power
of SPF . In addition, piL and piF denote the payoff of the CP
and SP respectively, and dL and dF denote the payoff each
decision maker receives in case of disagreement, i.e. disagree-
ment payoff. In order to characterize the disagreement payoffs,
we assume that in case of disagreement, the SPs will play the
sequential game whose outcome characterized previously in
Section III-B. Note that the value of the disagreement payoff
for the SPs can have an effect similar to the bargaining power
(w for SPF and 1− w for the SPL).
Using standard game theoretic results in [14], the pair of pi∗L
and pi∗F can be identified as the Nash bargaining solution of
the problem if and only if it solves the following optimization
problem:
max
piL,piF
(piF − dF )w(piL − dL)1−w
s.t.
(piL, piF ) ∈ U
(piL, piF ) ≥ (dL, dF )
(22)
where U is the set of feasible payoff pairs, and piF and piL
are of the form of (1) and (2).
Since SPs bargain over s, IL, and IF , the maximization (22),
should be over s, IL > Imin,L, and IF ≤ IL. Thus the
maximization is,
max
s,IL,IF
(piF − dF )w(piL − dL)1−w
s.t.
0 ≤ IF ≤ IL
IL ≥ Imin,L
piL ≥ dL
piF ≥ dF
(23)
We define s∗, I∗L, and I
∗
F to be the optimum solution of (23).
Note that these parameters combined with results in Theorem 2
and Equation (8) characterize the optimum division of profit
(pi∗L and pi
∗
F ) and thus the NBS.
In addition, we define the aggregate excess profit to be the
additional profit yielded from the cooperation in the bargaining
framework:
Definition 3. Aggregate Excess Profit (uexcess): The aggre-
gate excess profit is defined as follows:
uexcess = piL − dL + piF − dF
= nL(pL − c)− γI2L − dL + nF (pF − c)− dF
(24)
Note that uexcess is independent of s and is only a function
of IL and IF (since nL, nF , pL, and pF are functions of
IL and IF ). We define u∗excess = uexcess|IL=I∗L & IF=I∗F . Note
that the bargaining would only occur if u∗excess > 0, i.e. the
framework creates additional joint profit that can be divided
between the SPs. Thus, henceforth, we characterize the NBS
for the case that u∗excess > 0. We use uexcess in the following
theorem in which we characterize the NBS:
Theorem 5. If u∗excess > 0, the optimum solution of the
optimization (23) is (I∗F , I
∗
L, s
∗) in which I∗L = Imin,L > 0,
I∗F = Imin,L or I
∗
F = 0, and s
∗ is:
s∗ =
1
I∗F
2
(
n∗F (p
∗
F − c)− dF − wu∗excess
)
(25)
where n∗F = nF |IL=I∗L,IF=I∗F , p∗F = pF |IL=I∗L,IF=I∗F .
Remark 5. The theorem characterizes s∗,I∗L, and I∗F which
directly lead to the NBS (using results of Theorem 2, and
Equations 8, (1) and (2)), i.e. (pi∗L, pi
∗
F ). To find the NBS before
splitting the profit, SPs cooperatively maximize the aggregate
excess profit, uexcess by solving the maximization problem
(maxIF ,IL uexcess). Note that solution of this optimization is
a collusive outcome in which both SPs decreases the amount
of investment while maintaining a specific relative difference.
Subsequently, they decide the split of the additional profit, i.e.
the payment paid to SPL by SPF (s∗I∗F
2), based on (25) which
depends on the bargaining power each has (w and 1− w).
Proof. Note that dCP and dSP are independent of IL, IF ,
and s. In addition, uexcess is independent of s, and is only a
function of IL and IF . Thus, for a given s, it can be shown
that (please refer to equation (2) of [15] for the proof), the
optimum value of s is such that:
piF − dF
w
=
piL − dL
1− w
if the solution for s satisfies other constraints. Thus, by
plugging the expressions of piF and piL, (1) and (2), in (26),
and solving for s yields the candidate optimum s:
s∗ =
1
IF
2
(
(1− w)
(
nF (pF − c)− dF
)
− w
(
nL(pL − c)− γI2L − dL
))
=
1
IF
2
(
nF (pF − c)− dF − wuexcess
)
(26)
Substituting (26) in the objective function of (23) and using
(1) and (2) yield the new objective function:
ww(1− w)1−wuexcess
Substituting (26), (1), and (2) in the constraint piL ≥ dL
(similar to the previous step), yields the new constraint
(1−w)uexcess ≥ 0. Similar substitutions for piF ≥ dF yields
wuexcess ≥ 0. Thus, the optimization can be written as,
max
IF ,IL
uexcess
s.t.
IL > Imin,L
0 ≤ IF ≤ IL
uexcess ≥ 0
(27)
Now, we rewrite the expression of uexcess by using the
definition of uexcess (24), the expressions for pL and pF in
Theorem 2, and the expressions for nL and nF (8). First, by
plugging the expressions of pL and pF from Theorem 2 in
(8), we can find nL and nF :
nL =
2IL − IF
3IL
& nF =
IL + IF
3IL
Note that since IL ≥ IF , nL > 0. In addition, IF > 0 yields
nL < 1. Now, plugging these expressions and the expressions
of pL and pF from Theorem 2 in (24), we have:
uexcess =
(
2IL − IF
3IL
)2
−γI2L−dL+
(
IL + IF
3IL
)2
−dF (28)
Consider t = IFIL , then:
uexcess =
(
2− t
3
)2
− γI2L − dL +
(
1 + t
3
)2
− dF (29)
First, we argue that I∗L = Imin,L. Suppose not. Then I
∗
L >
Imin,L. Consider I∗F to be the optimum solution of IF in
this case. Take, IˆL = I∗min,L and IˆF = I
∗
F
Imin,L
I∗L
. Note that
t =
I∗F
I∗L
= IˆFImin,L . Thus, using (29), since t is constant and
IL is lower than before, uexcess would be higher with IˆF and
Imin,L than with I∗F and I
∗
L. This contradicts with I
∗
L and I
∗
F
being optimum solutions. Thus, I∗L = Imin,L.
Now that we determined I∗L, it is left to determine t. Note
that the feasible set of t is 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. From (29), note that
d2uexcess
dt2 > 0. Thus, uexcess is convex, and the solution of the
maximization of max0≤t≤1 uexcess lie in the boundaries, i.e.
t∗ = 0 or t∗ = 1. Plugging these values of t in (29) yields the
same payoff. Thus, I∗F = 0 or I
∗
F = Imin,L.
These solution are the NBS only if they yield u∗excess > 0.
If not, bargaining would not occur. This completes the proof.
Remark 6. The price per sponsored resources (25) is a
decreasing function of w , i.e. the bargaining power of SPF :
the higher the bargaining power of SPF the lower the payment
paid to SPL. 4
4Note that the framework allows for positive or negative payments. How-
ever, results reveal that for all the numerically tested parameters, this payment
is positive.
IV. EUS WITH OUTSIDE OPTION
In the previous section, we considered a hotelling model
with full market coverage, i.e. when EUs should choose one
of the two SPs. Thus, there is no outside option in the hotelling
model. In this section, we consider the demand of SPs to be
generated both through the hotelling model and also a demand
function. The demand function captures two scenarios. It
models (i) attrition in the number of EUs when the investment
or price of both SPs are not desirable enough, i.e. the effect
of an outside option for EUs of hotelling model, and (ii) an
exclusive additional customer base for each of the SPs to draw
from depending on the investments and prices they offer.
In Section IV-A, we present the new model. In Section IV-B,
we characterize the SPNE strategies. We summarize the SPNE
outcome in section IV-C. In Section IV-D, we investigate
the bargaining framework for this case. Finally, we provide
numerical results in Section IV-E.
A. Model
To model the outside option, we consider a demand function
for each SP to be added to the demand from the hotelling
model. Thus,
Definition 4. The fraction of EUs with each SP is
n˜L = nL + ϕL(pL, IL),
n˜F = nF + ϕF (pF , IF ),
(30)
where
ϕL(pL, IL) = k−pL+b(IL−IF ), 5 ϕF (pF , IF ) = k−pF+bIF
(31)
and k and b are constants.
Note that ϕL(., .) and ϕF (., .) can be positive or negative. A
positive value denotes attracting EUs other than those consid-
ered in the hotelling model, and presumably from an exclusive
additional customer base, and a negative value denotes losing
some of the EUs considered in the hotelling model to an
outside option, i.e. attrition in the number of EUs. Now, we
proceed to characterize the SPNE using backward induction.
B. SPNE Analysis
We characterize the SPNE using backward induction start-
ing from Stage 3:
Stage 3: In this stage, SPL and SPF maximize their
utilities by determining their access prices for EUs, pL and
pF , respectively. We mainly focus on interior Nash equilibria,
i.e. 0 < nF < 1 and 0 < nL < 1. Using Definition 4, (4), (5),
and (8) the payoffs of SPs are:
piF =(tL + k + pL − 2pF + bIF )(pF − c)− sI2F
piL =(tF + k + pF − 2pL + bIL − bIF )(pL − c) + sI2F − γI2L
(32)
In the following theorem, we characterize the unique interior
NE:
5Note that the cofficient of pL is normalizd to one.
Theorem 6. For given IF and IL, the interior Nash strategies
of stage 3 are unique, and are:
p∗L =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tF
5
− b
5
IF +
4b
15
IL,
p∗F =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tL
5
+
b
15
IL +
b
5
IF .
(33)
if and only if IL satisfies:
IL <
4
b
, (34)
If IL = 4b , then p
∗
L and p
∗
F may constitute corner or interior
equilibrium strategies.
Proof. In this case, every NE by which 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1, should
satisfy the first order condition. Thus p∗L and p
∗
F should be
such that:
dpiL
dpL
|p∗L = 0,
dpiF
dpF
|p∗F = 0,
then
4p∗L − p∗F = tF + k + bIL − bIF + 2c
4p∗F − p∗L = tL + k + bIF + 2c.
(35)
Add the two equations on both sides, note tL + tF = 1, we
have:
p∗L + p
∗
F =
1
3
+
2k
3
+
4c
3
+
bIL
3
(36)
Substitute (36) into (35), then:
p∗L =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tF
5
− b
5
IF +
4b
15
IL,
p∗F =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tL
5
+
b
15
IL +
b
5
IF .
Take the second derivative of piL with respect to pL,
d2piL
d(p∗L)2
=
d2piF
d(p∗F )2
= −4 < 0
then p∗L and p
∗
F are the unique maximal solutions of piL and
piF , respectively.
Thus, p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique interior NE strategies if
and only if 0 < x0 < 1. Substitute (33), (4), and (5) into (7)
yields:
x0 =
4
5
− b
5
IL + (
2b
5
− 3
5IL
)IF , Ψ(IF ) (37)
Once IL is fixed, Ψ(IF ) would be a linear function of IF .
Thus, 0 < Ψ(IF ) < 1 for any values of IF such that 0 ≤
IF ≤ IL, if and only if 0 < Ψ(0) < 1 and 0 < Ψ(IL) < 1.
Note that Ψ(IL) = 15 +
b
5IL ∈ (0, 1) when 0 < IL < 4b , and
Ψ(0) = 45 − b5IL ∈ (0, 1) when 0 < IL < 4b . Note that if
IL =
4
b , then x0 can close any value in [0, 1]. Thus, p
∗
L and
p∗F may constitute corner or interior equilibria. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
To simplify the subsequent expressions, we define f(IL)
and g(IL) as follows:
Definition 5. g(IL) = b15IL+
1
15− c3+ k3 , f(IL) = 15IL + b5 > 0
Stage 2: In this stage, SPF decides on the investment level,
with the condition that 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL, to maximize piF .
Substituting (33) into (32), we have the following optimization
problem:
Lemma 1.
max
IF
piF = (2f
2(IL)− s)I2F + 4f(IL)g(IL)IF + 2g2(IL)
s.t 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL
piF ≥ 0
(38)
Proof. From (32), we have piF = (tL + k + pL − 2pF +
bIF )(pF − c)− sI2F . Note tL = IF /IL and tF = 1− tL
(i) First, we substitute the values in (tL+k+pL−2pF +bIF ):
tL + k + pL − 2pF + bIF =
tL + k − 1
15
− 2c
3
− k
3
+
tF
5
− 2tL
5
+
2b
15
IL − 3b
5
IF + bIF =
3tL
5
+
tF
5
+
2k
3
− 1
15
− 2c
3
+
2b
15
IL +
2b
5
IF =
2IF
5IL
+
2
15
+
2k
3
− 2c
3
+
2b
15
IL +
2b
5
IF = 2g(IL) + 2f(IL)IF .
(39)
(ii) Then, we compute pF − c,
pF−c = 1
15
− c
3
+
k
3
+
IF
5IL
+
b
15
IL+
b
5
IF = g(IL)+f(IL)IF (40)
(iii) From (i) and (ii), we have piF (pF ; pL, s, IL, IF ) =
2(g(IL) + f(IL)IF )
2 − sI2F = (2f2(IL) − s)I2F +
4f(IL)g(IL)IF + 2g
2(IL).
This completes the proof.
Theorem 7. For any given s, IL, let I0F to be the solution to
the first order condition on piF :
I0F =
−2f(IL)g(IL)
2f2(IL)− s (41)
Then, the unique optimal investment level of SPF , I∗F , is:
I∗F = I
0
F if (s, IL) ∈
{
s > 2f2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)/IL, g(IL) ≥ 0
}
I∗F = IL if (s, IL) ∈ {2f2(IL) ≤ s ≤ 2f2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)/IL,
g(IL) ≥ 0} ∪ {2f2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)/IL ≥ s, 2f2(IL) > s}
(42)
, if piF (I∗F ; IL) ≥ 0. If piF (I∗F ; IL) < 0, then no cooperation
occurs between the MNO and the MVNO.
Proof. We consider different cases. First, we consider the case
that 2f2(IL) − s = 0 (Step (i)). Then, we consider the case
that 2f2(IL) − s 6= 0 and piF is a quadratic function of IF
(Step (ii)). In Step (iii), we prove that I∗F 6= 0. Combining the
steps yields the result of the theorem.
Step (i): If 2f2(IL)− s = 0, piF is linear function of IF , i.e.,
piF = 4f(IL)g(IL)IF + 2g
2(IL)
Thus, {
I∗F = 0 if g(IL) < 0
I∗F = IL if g(IL) ≥ 0
.
Step (ii): Now, consider the case that 2f2(IL)−s 6= 0 and piF
is a quadratic function of IF . We characterize the optimum
answer in two cases: (a) if 2f2(IL) − s > 0, and (b) if
2f2(IL)− s < 0, piF (IF ; IL).
For the case that piF is a quadratic function, we use the
solution to the first order condition (I0F ):
dpiF
dIF
|I0F = 0⇒ I
0
F =
−2f(IL)g(IL)
2f2(IL)− s
Note that the symmetric axis of the quadratic function is
y = I0F . This is the vertical line that divide the quadratic
function into two identical halves.
Case (ii-a): If 2f2(IL)− s > 0, then piF is convex function,.
Thus, the maximal value must be obtained at the boundaries,
i.e., 0 or IL. To find the maximum value, we compare the
symmetric axis y = I0F with the midpoint of the two boundary
points 6. The midpoint of boundary points is IL/2. Hence,
I0F −
IL
2
≤ 0 if 2ILf2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)− ILs ≥ 0
I0F −
IL
2
> 0 if 2ILf2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)− ILs < 0
,
thus{
I∗F = IL if 2ILf
2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)− ILs ≥ 0
I∗F = 0 if 2ILf
2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)− ILs < 0
.
Case (ii-b): If 2f2(IL)−s < 0, then piF is a concave function.
Thus, the maximal value is either at 0, IL or I0F . Now we
compare the symmetric axis y = I0F with the boundary points
to find the maximum value:
I0F − 0 < 0 if g(IL) < 0
0 ≤ I0F < IL if 2ILf2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)− ILs < 0, g(IL) ≥ 0
I0F ≥ IL if 2ILf2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)− ILs ≥ 0, g(IL) ≥ 0
,
Thus,
I∗F = 0 if g(IL) < 0
I∗F = I
0
F if 2ILf
2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)− ILs < 0, g(IL) ≥ 0
I∗F = IL if 2ILf
2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)− ILs ≥ 0, g(IL) ≥ 0
.
Step (iii): We now prove I∗F 6= 0. From Case (ii-a), if I∗F = 0,
then 2ILf2(IL)+4f(IL)g(IL)−ILs < 0, i.e., s > 2f2(IL)+
4f(IL)g(IL)/IL, which implies g(IL) < 0 since 2f2(IL) −
s > 0. Thus from Step (i), and Cases (ii-a) and (ii-b), if I∗F =
0, then g(IL) < 0.
Since t∗L = 0 and t
∗
F = 1, when I
∗
F = 0, then p
∗
F − c =
1
15 − c3 + k3 + b5IF = g(IL) < 0. For an equilibrium solution
p∗F , p
∗
F ≥ c, otherwise pi∗L = n∗F (p∗F −c)−s(I∗F )2 < 0. Hence
I∗F = 0 can not be an equilibrium solution for SPF .
Combining Steps (i), (ii), and (iii), yields:
I∗F = I
0
F if (s, IL) ∈
{
s > 2f2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)/IL, g(IL) ≥ 0
}
I∗F = IL if (s, IL) ∈ {2f2(IL) ≤ s ≤ 2f2(IL) + 2f(IL)g(IL)/IL,
g(IL) ≥ 0} ∪ {2f2(IL) + 4f(IL)g(IL)/IL ≥ s, 2f2(IL) > s}
(43)
Intuitively, I∗F is the optimum solution if it yields piF ≥ 0.
If not, i.e. piF < 0, then no cooperation occurs between the
MNO and the MVNO. The theorem follows.
6Note that the function is symmetric around the symmetric axis. Thus, if
the midpoint is at the right (respectively, left) of the symmetric axis, then the
right (respectively, left) boundary yields the highest value.
Stage 1: In this stage, MNO decides on the level of
investment IL to maximize his payoff piL:
Theorem 8. The optimum investment level of the MNO is the
solution to the following optimization problem:
max
IL
piL(IL; I
∗
F ) = 2(
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL)− f(IL)I∗F )2 + s(I∗F )2 − γI2L
s.t 0 < IL ≤ 4
b
piL(IL) ≥ 0
(44)
Proof. From (32), we have piL = (tF +k+pF −2pL+ bIL−
bIF )(pL − c) + sI2F − γI2L.
(i) First, we substitute the values in tF +k+pF −2pL+bIL−
bIF . We use the expressions for tL and tF , i.e. tL = IF /IL
and tF = 1− tL:
tF + k + pF − 2pL + bIL − bIF = tF + k − 1
15
− 2c
3
− k
3
+
tL
5
− 2tF
5
− 7b
15
IL +
3b
5
IF + bIL − bIF
=
3tF
5
+
2k
3
− 1
15
− 2c
3
+
tL
5
+
8b
15
IL − 2b
5
IF
=
2tF
5
+
2k
3
+
2
15
− 2c
3
+
8b
15
IL − 2b
5
IF
=2g(IL) +
2
5
− 2IF
5IL
− 2b
5
IF +
2b
5
IL
=2(
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL)− f(IL)IF ).
(ii) Then, we compute pL − c:
pL − c = 1
15
− c
3
+
k
3
+
1
5
− IF
5IL
− b
5
IF +
4b
15
IL
=
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL)− f(IL)IF .
(iii) From (i) and (ii), we have piL =
2( b5IL +
1
5 + g(IL)− f(IL)I∗F )2 + s(I∗F )2 − γI2L. The
theorem follows.
Later, in Section IV-E, we find the solution to the optimiza-
tion in Theorem 8, using numerical analysis.
C. The SPNE Outcome
We characterize the equilibrium outcome of the game using
the results of previous analysis.
Corollary 3. The equilibrium outcome of the game is
• Stage 1: I∗L is characterized by solving the optimization
in Theorem 8.
• Stage 2: I∗F is characterized in Theorem 7.
• Stage 3: p∗L =
1
15+
2c
3 +
k
3 +
I∗L−I∗F
5I∗L
− b5I∗F + 4b15I∗L, p∗F =
1
15 +
2c
3 +
k
3 +
I∗F
5I∗L
+ b15I
∗
L +
b
5I
∗
F .
• Stage 4: n˜∗L =
I∗L−I∗F
I∗L
+p∗F−2p∗L+k+bI∗L−bI∗F , n˜∗F =
I∗F
I∗L
+ p∗L − 2p∗F + k + bI∗F .
Proof. Stage 1 and 2 are immediate from Theorems 7 and 8.
The results of Stage 3 is found by substituting the results of
Theorem 7 in the expressions for p∗F and p
∗
L in Theorem 6.
The result of Stage 4, is found by substituting the results of
previous stages in (30).
D. Bargaining Framework
In Section III-D, we investigated the bargaining framework
for the hotelling model. In Theorem 5, we characterized the
NBS of the problem. Since we do not used the explicit
expressions of the parameters, we can use the results of this
theorem. Thus, to find the NBS, we should solve the following
optimization problem:
max
IF ,IL
uexcess
s.t. 0 < IL ≤ 4
b
0 ≤ IF ≤ IL
uexcess > 0
, where the first inequality is from Theorem 6 and is essential
for having an interior NE strategy.
First, we find the expression for uexcess in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. For any dF and dL, uexcess = 4f2(IL)I2F −
4f2(IL)ILIF+2g
2(IL)+2(f(IL)IL+g(IL))
2−γI2L−dF−dL.
Proof. Since uexcess = piL − dL + piF − dF , then from (38)
and (44),
uexcess = piL − dL + piF − dF = (2f2(IL)− s)I2F
+ 4f(IL)g(IL)IF + 2g
2(IL) + 2(
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL)− f(IL)IF )2
+ sI2F − γI2L − dF − dL
=2f2(IL)I
2
F + 4f(IL)g(IL)IF + 2g
2(IL)− 4( b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL))f(IL)IF + 2f
2(IL)I
2
F + 2(
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL))
2 − γI2L
− dF − dL
=4f2(IL)I
2
F + 2g
2(IL)− 4( b
5
IL +
1
5
)f(IL)IF
+ 2(
b
5
IL +
1
5
+ g(IL))
2 − γI2L − dF − dL
=4f2(IL)I
2
F − 4f2(IL)ILIF + 2g2(IL) + 2(f(IL)IL + g(IL))2
− γI2L − dF − dL
In the next Theorem, we prove that in the NBS, the MVNO
either reserves all the available resources or zero resources
from the MNO:
Theorem 9. If u∗excess > 0, in the NBS I∗F = I∗L or I∗F = 0.
Remark 7. In this case, NBS is a milder version of the
collusive outcome of the previous case in which EUs have no
outside option. Note that SPL no longer opts for the minimum
possible IL. However, in the NBS, SPF either reserves all the
resources (I∗F = I
∗
L) or no resources (I
∗
F = 0).
Proof. The second derivative of uexcess with respect to IF is:
d2uexcess
dI2F
= 8f2(IL) > 0
Fig. 3: Investment decisions of SPs vs. γ(left) and s (right)
Fig. 4: Investment decisions of SPs vs. s for k = 0.75(left)
and k = 1.5 (right)
Thus, uexcess is convex with respect to IF , and the maximum
of uexcess is obtained at the boundaries of IF , i.e. I∗F = 0 or
I∗F = I
∗
L. This completes the proof of this theorem.
E. Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical results. First, we
focus on the sequential framework and the SPNE outcome
characterized in Section IV-C. Then, we provide the numerical
results for ther bargaining framework.
1) SPNE Outcome: In Figure 3-left, we plot the optimum
investment level of SPs with respect to marginal cost of
investment(γ). Note that the number of resources invested by
SPL is decreasing with γ, and the number of resources that
SPF leases from SPL is increasing with γ (Figure 1-left). The
reason for the former is intuitive: the higher the cost, the lower
the investment. The latter happens since increasing γ while s
is fixed increases the desirability of the resources for SPF .
Note that in model (Section II), we assumed that to have a
non-trivial problem the per resource fee should be higher than
the marginal cost of investment, i.e. s ≥ γ. This is the reason
that in Figure 3-left, when γ > s = 2 the investment by the
SPs is zero.
In Figure 3-right, we plot the optimum investment level of
SPs with respect to the per resource fee that SPF pays to SPL.
Note that the overall behavior of the number of resources with
respect to s is similar to that of the previous model presented in
Figure 1. The only difference is the behavior of the investment
by SPL (IL) when s is higher than a threshold. In previous
results (Figure 1), this value was decreasing with s. However,
in this model, the behavior of IL with respect to s depends on
the parameters of the demand function (ϕ(., .)). We investigate
Fig. 5: Prices for EUs (left) and payoff of SPs (right) vs. s
this dependency by considering different values of k, i.e. the
bias constant in the demand function. Results reveal that when
k = 1 (Figure 3-right), then IL is constant with s, when
k = 0.75 (Figure 4-left), IL is decreasing, and when k = 1.5
(Figure 4-right), IL is increasing with s. Note that the higher
k, the higher the number of EUs generated with the demand
function ϕ(., .), and the more important this demand to the
SPs. In addition, the demand function is increasing with the
investment. Thus, as k increases, SPL has more incentive to
invest more to attract a higher number of EUs.
In Figure 5-left, we plot the pricing decision of SPs for EUs,
i.e. p∗L and p
∗
F . Note that results share many similarities with
those of the previous model (Figure 2). The main difference is
that in the region associated with small s’s, the prices that SPs
quote for EUs are no longer constant and independent of s. The
reason is because of considering the effect of a third option
and having a demand function that does not react only to the
differences in the investment of the SPs (relative difference of
SPs), but also to the absolute value of the investments. More
specifically, note that in the previous model, for small s’s,
SPF reserves all the new resources of SPL (Figure 1). Thus,
by the definition of the tj’s (4) and (5), the decision of EUs
in the hotelling model would be independent of the level of
investments and subsequently independent of s. However, in
the new model, although again for small s’s, SPF reserves
all the new resources of SPL, the decision of EUs associated
with the newly added demand functions (ϕ(., .)’s) would be
still dependent on the resources and s. This yields that the
prices for EUs are no longer constant when s is smaller than
a threshold. Results also reveal that similar to the previous
model, the behavior of the number of EUs with SPs (n˜L and
n˜F ) with respect to s follows the same trend as the behavior
of the prices.
In Figure 5-right, we plot the payoff of SPs with respect
to the per resource fee, s. Note that the payoff of SPL is
increasing and the payoff of SPF is decreasing with respect
to s.
2) Bargaining Framework: Now, we focus on the bargain-
ing framework. Note that in Theorem 9, we proved that in
the bargaining framework, SPF either reserves all the newly
created resources or no resources from SPL. Numerical results
also confirm this (Figure 6-left). Recall that in the previous
model (Theorem 5), in a bargaining framework, SPL reserves
Fig. 6: Investment decisions of SPs (left) and payoffs (right)
in the bargaining framework vs. γ
a minimum number of resources. However, in the new model,
I∗L is a solution of an optimization problem and does not
necessarily assume values on the boundaries, i.e. minimum
value (Figure 6-left).
In Figure 6-right, we plot the payoff of SPs with respect
to the marginal cost of investment (γ) after the bargaining
when the relative bargaining power of SPF over SPL (w) is
0.2. Results reveal that when the marginal cost of investment
is smaller (respectively, larger) than a threshold, then SPL
(respectively, SPF ) is the SP that receives a higher payoff.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the incentives of a Mobile Network Oper-
ators (MNO) for offering some of her resources to a Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) instead of using the
resources for her own End-Users (EUs). We considered a
continuum of undecided EUs with two different models: (i)
when EUs need to choose either the MNO or the MVNO, and
(ii) when EUs have an outside option. In each of these cases,
we considered a non-cooperative framework of sequential
games and a cooperative framework of bargaining game. We
characterized the SPNE and the NBS of the sequential and
bargaining games, respectively, and provided insights on the
interplay of competition and cooperation between the MNO
and the MVNO.
REFERENCES
[1] M. H. Lotfi and S. Sarkar, “The economics of competition and cooper-
ation between mnos and mvnos,” in Information Sciences and Systems
(CISS), 2017 51st Annual Conference on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[2] A. Morris, “Report: Number of mvnos exceeds 1,000 globally,” Sep 2,
2015.
[3] L. Cano, A. Capone, G. Carello, M. Cesana, and M. Passacantando,
“Cooperative infrastructure and spectrum sharing in heterogeneous mo-
bile networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 2617–2629, 2016.
[4] R. Berry, M. Honig, T. Nguyen, V. Subramanian, H. Zhou, and R. Vohra,
“On the nature of revenue-sharing contracts to incentivize spectrum-
sharing,” in INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2013, pp.
845–853.
[5] H. Le Cadre, M. Bouhtou, and B. Tuffin, “A pricing model for a mobile
network operator sharing limited resource with a mobile virtual network
operator,” in International Workshop on Internet Charging and QoS
Technologies. Springer, 2009, pp. 24–35.
[6] C. Singh, S. Sarkar, A. Aram, and A. Kumar, “Cooperative profit sharing
in coalition-based resource allocation in wireless networks,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking (TON), vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 69–83, 2012.
[7] O. Korcak, T. Alpcan, and G. Iosifidis, “Collusion of operators in wire-
less spectrum markets,” in Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc
and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2012 10th International Symposium on.
IEEE, 2012, pp. 33–40.
[8] A. Banerjee and C. M. Dippon, “Voluntary relationships among mobile
network operators and mobile virtual network operators: An economic
explanation,” Information Economics and Policy, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 72–
84, 2009.
[9] M. H. Lotfi and S. Sarkar, “Uncertain price competition in a duopoly
with heterogeneous availability,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Con-
trol, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 1010–1025, 2016.
[10] M. H. Lotfi, K. Sundaresan, S. Sarkar, and M. A. Khojastepour, “Eco-
nomics of quality sponsored data in non-neutral networks,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 2017.
[11] Y. Yan, J. Huang, X. Zhong, M. Zhao, and J. Wang, “Sequential
bargaining in cooperative spectrum sharing: Incomplete information with
reputation effect,” in Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBE-
COM 2011), 2011 IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–5.
[12] Y. Yan, J. Huang, and J. Wang, “Dynamic bargaining for relay-based
cooperative spectrum sharing,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 31, no. 8, pp. 1480–1493, 2013.
[13] M. Tao and Y. Liu, “Spectrum leasing and cooperative resource allo-
cation in cognitive ofdma networks,” Journal of Communications and
Networks, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 102–110, 2013.
[14] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, Bargaining and markets. Academic
press San Diego, 1990, vol. 34.
[15] A. Muthoo, “The economics of bargaining,” Fundamental Economics,
vol. 1, 2002.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove that there is no corner equilibrium
for Stage 2 of the game. Thus, we focus on equilibrium
strategies by which nL = 0 or nF = 0. First, we prove the
case for nL = 0:
Theorem 10. There is no NE strategy for Stage 2 of the game
by which nL = 0.
Proof. In this case, xn ≤ 0. Thus, using (1), (2), (8), the
payoffs of SPs would be:
piF = pF − c− sIkF
piL = sI
k
F − γIkL
(45)
Note that the equilibrium strategies p∗L and p
∗
F should be
such that xn ≤ 0. Thus, by (7), p∗F ≤ p∗L− IL−IFIL . Therefore,
since the payoff of SPF is a strictly increasing function of pF ,
p∗F = p
∗
L− IL−IFIL . We first argue that p∗L ≤ c. Then, we prove
that there exists no equilibrium strategy in this case.
We start by proving that p∗L ≤ c. Suppose not and p∗L > c.
Then, a deviation by SPL such that p′L = p
∗
L −  for  > 0
infinitesimal small yields that 0 < xn < 1. In this case, nL >
0, and p′L > c. Thus, by (2) and since IF and IL are the same
as before, the payoff would be higher after the deviation. Thus,
p∗L > c cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Therefore, p
∗
L ≤ c.
Now, consider the strategy of SPF , i.e. p∗F = p
∗
L − IL−IFIL .
Note that p∗F − c ≤ 0. Consider the deviation by SPF such
that p′F = p
∗
F +  for  > 0 infinitesimal small. In this case,
0 < xn < 1. Using (1) and since p∗F − c ≤ 0 and IF and
IL are the same as before, the payoff would be higher after
the deviation. Thus, p∗F cannot be an equilibrium strategy. The
theorem follows.
Now, we prove the case for nF = 0:
Theorem 11. There is no NE strategy for Stage 2 of the game
by which nF = 0.
Proof. In this case, xn ≥ 1. Thus, using (1), (2), (8), the
payoffs of SPs would be:
piF = −sIkF
piL = pL − c+ sIkF − γIkL
(46)
Note that the equilibrium strategies p∗L and p
∗
F should be
such that xn ≥ 1. Thus, by (7), p∗L ≤ p∗F − IFIL . Therefore,
since the payoff of SPL is a strictly increasing function of pL,
p∗L = p
∗
F − IFIL . We first argue that p∗F ≤ c. Then, we prove
that there exists no equilibrium strategy in this case.
We start by proving that p∗F ≤ c. Suppose not and p∗F > c.
Then, a deviation by SPF such that p′F = p
∗
F −  for  > 0
infinitesimal small yields that 0 < xn < 1. In this case, nF >
0, and p′L > c. Thus, by (1) and since IF and IL are the same
as before, the payoff would be higher after the deviation. Thus,
p∗F > c cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Therefore, p
∗
F ≤ c.
Now, consider the strategy of SPL, i.e. p∗L = p
∗
F − IFIL .
Note that p∗L − c ≤ 0. Consider the deviation by SPL such
that p′L = p
∗
L +  for  > 0 infinitesimal small. In this case,
0 < xn < 1. Using (2) and since p∗L − c ≤ 0 and IF and
IL are the same as before, the payoff would be higher after
the deviation. Thus, p∗L cannot be an equilibrium strategy. The
theorem follows.
Theorems 10 and 11 yields the result in Theorem 1.
